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I. INTRODUCTION 
In many European Union (“EU”) countries, the way in which 
environmental crime is described in legislation has undergone 
revolutionary shifts during the last thirty years. Environmental law first 
emerged in most EU countries in the 1970s. These early efforts give rise 
to three basic observations regarding environmental crime. First, the role 
that criminal law played in most of this legislation was relatively modest. 
Environmental laws of a primarily administrative character, i.e. those that 
imposed an obligation upon operators to apply for a permit and to run the 
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operation in accordance with permit conditions, were appended with 
criminal provisions merely holding that he who acts in disobedience of 
that particular administrative obligation is subject to criminal sanctions. 
This phenomenon has been characterized as the administrative 
dependence of environmental criminal law. Environmental crime was 
thus not defined in an independent manner that took into account the 
nature of the danger to the environment caused by a particular behavior. 
Second, the fact that environmental crimes were simply created by 
legislators as a kind of appendix to administrative laws gave them a low 
priority in enforcement policy. Most enforcement authorities—
particularly prosecutors—view the most important crimes as those 
incorporated in the penal code. As a result, the prosecution of crimes 
embedded in special administrative laws received lower priority. 
Third, the criminal law was basically the only instrument available to 
enforce these administrative environmental laws in EU Member States.1 
Other penalties aiming at deterrence, such as administrative fines, were 
not available in most legal systems.2 Given the fact that prosecutors did 
not give crimes embedded in special administrative laws high priority, 
environmental crimes were not prosecuted in many countries and many 
violations were therefore dismissed. 
Of course, I do realize that this characterization of environmental 
criminal law in EU Member States may to some extent constitute a rather 
crude generalization. There may well have been individual Member 
States where environmental crime was incorporated into the penal code 
and where more prosecutions of environmental crime took place. 
However, on the whole it is fair to characterize early environmental 
criminal law as largely dependent on an administrative basis because this 
generally describes the state of many European legal systems. 
In this Article, I will argue that the way in which the concept of 
environmental crime has developed in Europe, or the way in which 
environmental crime has been defined in legislation, has dramatically 
changed in the past thirty years. The most important change is that the 
criminal provisions are no longer just an “add on” to administrative 
environmental laws—legislators have undertaken attempts to formulate 
the protection of the environment through the criminal law in a more 
                                                                                                             
1 Currently the EU consists of 28 Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See EU member countries in brief, EUROPEAN 
UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en (last visited on 
Aug. 2, 2017). In the June 2016 Brexit-referendum the UK voted in favor of leaving the EU, a 
process that is most likely going to take shape later in 2017. 
2 Germany with its Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz constitutes an important exception. 
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independent manner. The dependence upon administrative law has 
become less absolute. A second important evolution, although somewhat 
later in time, is that in many Member States a so-called “toolbox” 
approach has been introduced. This refers to the fact that criminal law is 
now considered as only one of several enforcement instruments available. 
Given that the most repressive environmental sanctions are available 
within criminal law, they are considered an “ultimum remedium” or 
“ultima ratio.” That idea led in many legal systems to either an increasing 
use or the introduction of administrative fines as an alternative to criminal 
prosecution. Prosecution in those systems is reserved for those instances 
where administrative fines could not provide sufficient deterrence. 
A third (r)evolution which can be observed in some (although certainly 
not all) EU Member States is that the place of environmental criminal law 
has changed. The most important point is that the decreasing 
administrative dependence of environmental criminal law coincides with 
a “better place” for environmental crime within the environmental law 
framework. Prominence has given rise to codification in either special 
environmental codes or even within penal codes. 
In this Article, I will try to describe, sketch, and analyze these 
evolutions at the positive level. I argue that these changes have to an 
important extent been influenced by various influential doctrinal changes. 
An important one comes from German legal doctrine that emerged in the 
1980s addressing the legal dogmatic foundations of environmental 
criminal law; another, of more recent date, comes from the United 
Kingdom where scholars (and increasingly policy makers) have been 
arguing that administrative fining systems should be added to the 
enforcement toolbox along with criminal prosecution. I argue that these 
doctrinal changes have (at least implicitly) had an important influence on 
the policy change that we can observe in the way environmental crime is 
currently described in legislation, more particularly in its relationship to 
other enforcement systems. 
At the normative level, these doctrinal moves and the corresponding 
policy changes are to a large extent desirable in the sense that they 
provide a more adequate and cost effective protection to the environment. 
This observation is not meant to suggest that the quality of environmental 
criminal legislation in all EU Member States is now such that there is no 
further room for improvement. Rather, simply that these changes may be 
viewed as normatively desirable. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide detailed proof of policy 
changes in all EU Member States. I focus instead on examples of 
doctrinal changes in a few prominent Member States to show how they 
have affected policy. However, this Article will examine policy changes 
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found at the EU level—more particularly, in the way in which 
environmental crime is defined in the so-called Environmental Crime 
Directive—to highlight that the revolution in environmental criminal law 
in Europe reaches beyond changes observed in individual Member States. 
This Article is arranged in six parts. Part II outlines the traditional 
enforcement approach as it emerged in the 1980s. Part III sketches some 
doctrinal changes away from the traditional enforcement approach 
baseline and Part IV discusses data concerning the enforcement of 
environmental law. I then turn to policy changes in Part V and conclude 
in Part VI. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT APPROACH 
As already discussed above, the traditional approach when 
environmental criminal law emerged in Europe (in most Member States 
in the 1970s–80s) was characterized by the following features: 
environmental criminal law could be found in administrative laws, there 
was a strong administrative dependence of environmental criminal law, 
and criminal law seemed to be the primary tool because there were not 
many alternatives available. 
A. The Place of Environmental Criminal Law 
At the advent of environmental statutes in the European Union, 
criminal law aiming at the protection of the environment usually came as 
an appendix to legislation having largely an administrative character. One 
example is the Belgian (Federal) Surface Water Protection Act of 1971.3 
Article 2 of this Act prohibited emitting substances or discharging 
polluted liquids or gasses into surface waters, but excepted discharging 
wastewater with a license granted through the Act. Article 5 subsequently 
held that all discharge of wastewater was dependent on a license. The 
remainder of the Act stipulated in detail which administrative authority 
could provide the discharge permit and which conditions could be 
imposed on such a permit. 
The criminal law provision is found in Article 41 of the Belgian Act. 
This Article punished, inter alia, anyone who violates the provisions of 
the Act or the executive orders made thereunder. More particularly it 
punished anyone who would, in violation of Article 5, discharge 
                                                                                                             
3 Wet op de bescherming van de oppervlaktewateren tegen verontreiniging [Surface Water 
Protection Act] of 26 March 1971, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 
1, 1971 [hereinafter Surface Water Protection Act]. 
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wastewater into the surface waters without a permit or in violation of the 
permit conditions.4 
The structure of this criminal provision already shows a strong 
relationship between administrative law and environmental criminal law, 
but that is a point on which we will focus below. For now, it suffices to 
notice that, in contrast to other criminal provisions, the description of 
environmental crime cannot be found either in a specific environmental 
code or in the penal code itself. Belgium, however, was not the only 
country where environmental crime could only be found in 
environmental statutes of an administrative nature. For example, in 
France the major provisions concerning environmental crime emerged in 
the 1970s. They could be found in the Act of July 15, 1975 concerning 
the discharge of waste and recycling of materials5 and in an Act on 
Classified Installations of July 19, 1976.6 Article 18 of this Act, inter alia, 
punished anyone who would operate a hazardous installation without the 
required license. A similar approach could also be found in the United 
Kingdom where criminal provisions with respect to the environment were 
laid down in a variety of environmental statutes such as the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990, the Waste Resources Act 1991, the 
Water Industry Act 1991, the Clean Air Act 1993, and the Environment 
Act 1995.7 
This structure, whereby the criminal provisions could only be found at 
the end of an administrative law, had a few obvious disadvantages. One 
practical disadvantage arose from the fact that environmental crime was 
not described (by the legislator) in a harmonized and coordinated way. 
Rather, provisions could be found in a variety of different administrative 
laws, aiming at the regulation of waste, climate classified installations, 
protection of the surface water, ground water, air, etc. This scattered 
nature of environmental criminal law made it difficult for enforcers to 
                                                                                                             
4 Article 41 also provided other prohibitions that were criminalized, but that is not material for 
this discussion. See generally Susan F. Mandiberg & Michael G. Faure, A Graduated Punishment 
Approach to Environmental Crimes: Beyond Vindication of Administrative Authority in the United 
States and Europe, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 347, 353 (2009). 
5 Loi No. 75-633 du 15 julliet 1975 Relatif à l’élimination de déchets et la récupération des 
matériaux [Law No. 75-633 of July 15, 1975 Relating to the Disposal of Waste and the Recovery 
of Materials], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], July 16, 1975, p. 7279, in MICHAEL FAURE & GÜNTER HEINE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMINAL LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: DOCUMENTATION OF THE MAIN PROVISIONS WITH 
INTRODUCTIONS 128–30 (2000) [hereinafter FAURE & HEINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW]. 
6 Loi No. 76-663 du 19 julliet 1976 Relatif aux installations classées pour la protection de 
l’environnement [Law No. 75-633 of July 19, 1976 Relating to Installations Classified for the 
Protection of the Environment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 20, 1976, p. 4320, in FAURE & HEINE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 133–36. 
7 See FAURE & HEINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 347–60. 
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determine the extent to which particular behavior would be prohibited by 
the criminal law.8 A second disadvantage was that law enforcers (both 
prosecutors and judges) may have considered environmental crime to be 
less important because it was not incorporated into actual penal codes.9 
This signaled that the values protected by environmental criminal 
provisions were not being regarded as important as the values and 
interests protected in the penal code and hence deserved a lower priority. 
The fact that environmental crime could not be found in a penal code or 
in specific environmental legislation (at least in many legal systems) was 
criticized in the literature.10 Practitioners held that lack of penal 
codification was undesirable and less effective.11 
However, even in the 1980s, some countries did incorporate 
environmental crime into their penal code. Germany provides a striking 
example. As a result of the entry into force of the 18th 
Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz on the first of July 1980, provisions 
concerning environmental crime were incorporated in sections of the 
German Strafgesetzbuch.12 German legal observers commented that 
penal codification that excluded less serious crime, would enhance the 
deterrent effect of the environmental criminal laws, and would facilitate 
prosecution.13 
The Netherlands provides another example. The Netherlands already 
had specific provisions protecting surface waters in its penal code since 
an Act of November 13, 1969.14 In 1989 those provisions were changed 
                                                                                                             
8 For example, in Belgium it was not clear whether a discharge of substances other than 
wastewater (for which a permit was always required) into the surface waters would also constitute 
a crime under the Surface Water Protection Act of 1971 (on those debates see, MICHAEL FAURE, 
PREADVIES MILIEUSTRAFRECHT 72–80 (1990). German legal doctrine in particular considered the 
incorporation of environmental crime into the penal code as essential for an adequate protection of 
ecological interests. See, e.g., KLAUS TIEDEMANN, DIE NEUORDNUNG DES 
UMWELTSTRAFRECHTS: GUTACHTLICHE STELLUNGNAHME ZU DEM ENTWURF EINES 
SECHZEHNTEN STRAFRECHTSÄNDERUNGSGESETZES (GESETZ ZUR BEKÄMPFUNG DER 
UMWELTKRIMINALITÄT) 18 (1980). 
9 For example, in Belgium, commentators opined that “both environmental polluters as well as 
magistrates will only take environmental crime seriously if this crime is incorporated into the penal 
code, on condition that also the penalties are substantially increased.” FAURE, PREADVIES 
MILIEUSTRAFRECHT, supra note 8, at 56 (the author’s translation from Dutch). 
10 See, e.g., Paul Morrens, Enkele aktuele knelpunten in het leefmilieustrafrecht, 51 
RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 1281 (1987–1988) (arguing that incorporation of environmental crime 
into the penal code is necessary for magistrates to take environmental crime seriously.). 
11 This was a result of lower priority and fewer prosecutions. See Morrens, supra note 10, at 
1281. 
12 Klaus Tiedemann & Urs Kindhäuser, Umweltstrafrecht – Bewährung oder Reform?, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 339 (1988). 
13 TIEDEMANN, supra note 8, at 18. 
14 See generally Hein Heemskerk & Stefan Ubachs, Totstandkoming Artikel 173a en 173b Sr in 
1969, in HERZIENING VAN HET COMMUNE MILIEUSTRAFRECHT 9–11 (Michael G. Faure, Theo A. 
de Roos & Marjolein J.C. Visser eds., 2001). 
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into Articles 173a and 173b of the penal code.15 These provisions 
punished unlawful emissions into the soil, air, or surface waters where 
the perpetrator had reasons to suspect that this could lead to death or 
public health concerns.16 However, for a variety of reasons those 
provisions were also criticized both in Germany17 and in the 
Netherlands.18 In particular, as discussed below, these provisions were 
criticized for their continuing dependence upon administrative 
obligations.19 
B. Criminal Law’s Dependence on Administrative Law 
A second feature of how European criminal law protected the 
environment in the 1970s and 1980s in many jurisdictions was partially 
related to the fact that the criminal law was considered a complement to 
a primarily administrative legal framework.20 The fact that the criminal 
provisions were contained in environmental laws of a mainly 
administrative character took on more than symbolic importance, it had 
practical implications for the kind of environmental protection the 
criminal law could provide. 
Environmental criminal law in many countries was characterized as 
“administratively dependent.”21 Indeed, nations usually criminalize 
polluting without a permit or violating permit conditions (or other 
                                                                                                             
15 Wetboek van Strafrecht of 3 Mar. 1881 (establishing a criminal code that has since been 
amended many times). For an (unofficial) translation in English, see ACT OF 3 MARCH 1881, 
EUROPEAN JUDICIAL TRANING NETWORK, CRIMINAL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS 95 (2012). 
16 See generally Stefan Ubachs, De beweegredenen van de Wetgever bij de totstandkoming van 
de Artikelen 173a en 173b Sr, in HERZIENING VAN HET COMMUNE MILIEUSTRAFRECHT 12–14 
(Michael G. Faure, Theo A. de Roos & Marjolein J.C. Visser eds., 2001). Article 173a of the 
criminal code of the Netherlands held that “any person who intentionally and unlawfully releases a 
substances onto or into the soil, into the air or into the surface shall be liable to: 
1° a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 years or a fine of the 5th category, if such act is 
likely to endanger public health or the life of another; 
2° a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or a fine of the 5th category, if such act is 
likely to endanger the life of another person and the offence results in the death of a person.” 
EUROPEAN JUDICIAL TRANING NETWORK, CRIMINAL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS 95 (2012). 
17 See GÜNTER HEINE & VOLKER MEINBERG, EMPFEHLEN SICH ÄNDERUNGEN IM 
STRAFRECHTLICHEN UMWELTSCHUTZ, INSBESONDERE, IN VERBINDUNG MIT DEM 
VERWALTUNGSRECHT? GUTACHTEN FÜR DEN 57. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG, VERHANDLUNGEN 
DES 57. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES (1988). 
18 Michael Faure, Het Nederlandse Milieustrafrecht: dringend aan herziening toe!, RM THEMIS 
3–12 (1997). 
19 Günter Heine, Verwaltungsakzessorietät des Umweltstrafrechts, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT 2425–34 (1990). 
20 Although not completely, because the problem of the administrative dependence of the 
criminal law also emerged in the provisions contained in the penal code. 
21 This administrative dependence of the criminal law has especially been studied in German 
legal doctrine. It was there known under the notion Verwaltungsakzessorietät. See WOLFGANG 
WINKELBAUER, ZUR VERWALTUNGSAKZESSORIETÄT DES UMWELTSTRAFRECHTS (1985). 
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obligations).22 Administrative law therefore largely provides norms that 
individuals and corporations have to obey. Often the criminal law is 
limited to a disposition at the end of a particular administrative 
environmental law, holding that he who violates the provisions of this 
statute will be punished with a particular sanction.23 
One consequence of this structure is that ecological values are not 
directly protected through criminal law. For example, even grave 
pollution of soil or water is not necessarily punishable.24 A particular act 
must at the same time constitute a violation of an administrative 
obligation to give rise to criminal liability. Administrative dependence 
therefore limits the scope to criminalize pollution directly. Moreover, this 
administrative dependence also has as a consequence that it will be the 
administrative authorities that receive wide powers to determine the 
punishable nature of certain polluting acts. Indeed, administrative 
authorities define the conditions of a permit and with that they effectively 
also determine the conditions for criminal liability.25  Some have held that 
as a result of this administrative dependence the criminal law loses some 
of its autonomy since the intervention of the criminal law is only possible 
in case of a violation of administrative obligations.26 
In that sense, one can see that the structure of environmental criminal 
law is quite different from the structure of the traditional crimes which 
protect individual values like life, health, or property. Violations or 
endangerments of these traditional individual interests are directly 
criminalized without the intervention of administrative authorities. Some 
                                                                                                             
22 See the example of Article 41 of the Belgian Surface Water Protection Act of 1971. See 
Surface Water Protection Act, supra note 3, at Art. 41 (punishing anyone who would discharge 
wastewater into the surface waters without a permit or in violation of the permit conditions, 
discussed in the previous section). 
23 This was typically the case in Article 41 of the Belgian Surface Water Act of 1971, which has 
already been discussed above. 
24 In a well-known case, the Antwerp Court of Appeal considered pollution caused by the 
German pharmaceutical company Bayer. In that particular case, there was no valid license, but the 
court held that Bayer was not to blame since there was no license due to an administrative error. 
The administrative dependence of environmental criminal law did not allow the court to verify 
whether or not Bayer’s emissions was an illegal pollution. For a discussion of this Bayer case, see 
Michael Faure, Towards a New Model of Criminalization of Environmental Pollution: The Case of 
Indonesia, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM THE INDONESIAN 
EXAMPLE 192–93 (Michael Faure & Nicole Niessen eds., 2006). 
25 For example, in the previous section of the Belgian Surface Water Protection Act of 1971 it 
was the administrative authorities that had the competence to determine the conditions of the 
permit. Violation of the permit conditions was criminalized in Article 41, which effectively meant 
that the administrative authority determined the conditions for criminal liability. See generally 
FAURE, PREADVIES MILIEUSTRAFRECHT, supra note 8, at 72–80. 
26 This was traditionally the case in many legal systems. For a good comparative overview in 
that respect see, inter alia, Mohan Prabhu, General Report: English Version, 64 INT’L REV. OF 
PENAL L. 699–728 (1994). 
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scholars have reasoned that a consequence of the administrative 
dependence of environmental criminal law is that the legal interest 
protected by law in this case is not the environment as such.27 The 
environment is indeed only protected to the extent that administrative law 
actually provides. Each case of environmental pollution will not 
automatically be criminalized; this will only be the case if a certain act 
equally constitutes a violation of an administrative obligation.28 
There has been some debate on whether or not this model is directed 
at protecting environmental values.29 To some extent, one could argue 
that the only value that is protected in the case of administrative 
dependence, is the interest of the administrative authority in the proper 
enforcement of the environmental law.30 However, it is now more widely 
accepted that these administrative statutes, especially as far as they lay 
down emission limit values, are also directed at the protection of the 
environment.31 Therefore a criminal provision, punishing a violation of 
these administrative rules also aims at the protection of the environment, 
albeit in an indirect way. For example, a criminal provision punishing 
anyone who operates a chemical plant without a license is also directed 
at protecting ecological values.32 Indeed, operating such a plant without a 
license might endanger the protected interest—a clean environment. 
However, since the criminal law applies irrespective of any specific 
damage or threat of harm to the environment these provisions punish an 
abstract endangerment of the environment.33 Although the goal of the 
criminal law provision can indirectly be environmental protection, that is 
not immediately clear from the way these provisions are formulated and 
operate. Indeed, the criminal law applies as soon as the administrative 
obligation (for instance, in the form of an emission limit value in a 
license) has been breached, whether or not this causes harm to the 
environment. 
In sum: if administrative obligations are fulfilled, no protection will be 
granted through the criminal law. On the other hand, if administrative 
obligations have not been determined at all, protection cannot be granted 
through the criminal law either. With this model of environmental 
                                                                                                             
27 See, e.g., THEO J.B. BUITING, STRAFRECHT EN MILIEU 32–34 (1993). 
28 See, e.g., ALAIN DE NAUW, LES MÉTAMORPHOSES ADMINISTRATIVES DU DROIT PÉNAL DE 
L’ENTREPRISE 84 (1994). 
29 Faure, Towards a Model of Criminalization of Environmental Pollution: The Case of 
Indonesia, supra note 24, at 191–92. 
30 Compare LEO E.M. HENDRIKS & J. WÖRETSHOFER, MILIEUSTRAFRECHT 29, 31–32 (1995) 
with BUITING, supra note 27 and CORNELIE WALING, HET MATERIËLE MILIEUSTRAFRECHT (1990). 
31 See Heine, Verwaltungsakzessorietät des Umweltstrafrechts, supra note 19, at 2425–34. 
32 HENDRIKS &WÖRETSHOFER, supra note 30, at 16–19. 
33 BUITING, supra note 27, at 1103–06; WALING, supra note 30, at 24, 58. 
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criminal law’s absolute dependence on administrative law, one is left 
with the impression that it is administrative interests rather than 
ecological values that are protected. 
C. Criminal Law as Primary Instrument 
In this traditional structure of environmental criminal law, not only 
was environmental criminal law dependent upon administrative law—to 
an important extent the reverse was also true. Only criminal law could 
force operators to comply with the administrative obligations. That is 
clear from the quoted examples from Belgium, France, and the United 
Kingdom. In those countries alternative mechanisms that could equally 
aim at deterrence, such as administrative fines, were not available. In this 
traditional setup, there was therefore no room for what could now be 
referred to as a toolbox approach,34 which has largely followed the so-
called enforcement pyramid developed by Ayres and Braithwaite,35 
whereby the criminal law would only be used at the top of the pyramid 
when all other mechanisms (like persuasion, administrative fines etc.) 
have failed. 
However, alternatives were available in Germany. Germany had used 
for a long time the Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht, a system of 
administrative penal law, which is a non-criminal sanctioning system that 
allows for the imposition of administrative fines (so called Geldbußen).36 
Other legal systems that were inspired by the German example, like 
Austria, had similar systems of administrative penal law, allowing for the 
imposition of fines.37 One should note, however, that in German legal 
doctrine there was a clear distinction between administrative violations 
that were subject to administrative penal law (administrative fines) and 
the Kernstrafrecht (core criminal law), which punished different 
violations considered to be of a different value.38 The decision whether a 
particular behavior would be sanctioned under administrative penal law 
(Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht) or under the criminal law was to be decided 
primarily by the legislator.39 German legal doctrine developed detailed 
and elaborate criteria to determine whether a particular behavior should 
                                                                                                             
34 This approach will be further explained below in Section III.B. 
35 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). 
36 See FAURE & HEINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 143–47. 
37 See id. at 9–13. 
38 On this distinction, see Dieter Schaffmeister, Politiële en justitiële delikten, in 1 
HANDELINGEN DER NEDERLANDSCHE JURISTEN-VEREENIGING, 127–291 (1984). 
39 Id. 
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be qualified by the legislator as an administrative offence or a crime.40 
This differs from an enforcement toolbox approach in which authorities 
decide (based upon a variety of criteria such as the nature of the violation, 
environmental harm caused, type of perpetrator, etc.) whether to follow 
an administrative or criminal route in a given case. 
III. TWO DOCTRINAL MOVES 
Two general features were typical, irrespective of the particular 
legislative form of European environmental crime, in the 1970s and 
1980s. First, there was the strong interrelationship between 
administrative and criminal law, and second the strong tendency towards 
criminalization of any violation of administrative environmental law. 
Two reactions emerged in legal doctrine against the negative implications 
of these features. First, the German response acting against the absolute 
dependence of environmental criminal law upon the administrative. And 
second, a practical response in favor of creating an enforcement toolbox 
with a more limited role for environmental criminal law. 
A. Umweltschutz durch Strafrecht? 
The well-known Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Criminal Law in Freiburg im Breisgau played an important role in the 
analysis of environmental criminal law in Europe. The institute launched 
a broad project under the title “Umweltschutz durch Strafrecht?” 
(“environmental protection through criminal law?”) to analyze the way 
in which the criminal law protected the environment in a wide variety of 
countries with special attention paid to the relationship between 
environmental criminal law, administrative, and civil law.41 The project 
stood under the coordination of Günter Heine, who himself published 
widely on environmental criminal law in Germany42 and internationally.43 
The general tenet in the project was to examine the limits of the criminal 
                                                                                                             
40 See, e.g., HEINZ MATTES, UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR LEHRE VON DEN 
ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN (1982). 
41 Michael G. Faure, Günter Heine und das Umweltstrafrecht in Europa, in STRAFRECHT ALS 
ULTIMA RATIO: GIEßENER GEDÄCHTNISSCHRIFT FÜR GÜNTER HEINE 111–25 (Walter Gropp, 
Bernd Hecker, Arthur Kreuzer, Christoph Ringelmann, Lars Witteck & Gabriele Wolfslast eds., 
2016). 
42 See, e.g., Günter Heine, Aspekte des Umweltstrafrechts im internationalen Vergleich, in 
GOLTDAMMER´S ARCHIV FÜR STRAFRECHT 67–88 (1986); Günter Heine, Zur Rolle des 
Strafrechtlichen Umweltschutzes, 101 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE 
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTEN 722–55 (1989). 
43 Günter Heine, Die Verwaltungsakzessorietät im deutschen Umweltstrafrecht unter 
Berücksichtigung des österreichischen Rechts. Aktuelle Probleme und Reformüberregungen, 11 
ÖSTERREICHISCHE JURISTEN ZEITUNG 370–78 (1991). 
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law in awarding its protection to the environment as well as to question 
the effectiveness of criminal law and determine how protection could be 
improved, especially in relation to administrative law.44 Heine and his 
team developed a model of environmental criminal law with a reduced 
dependence upon administrative law, at least with a more nuanced 
approach to the relationship. 
Legal thinking about environmental criminal law as developed by 
Günter Heine and others had a strong, worldwide influence. Many young 
scholars from a variety of European countries wrote dissertations on 
environmental criminal law under the supervision of Günter Heine and 
then director of the Max Planck Institute, Albin Eser.45 Doctoral 
dissertations on environmental criminal law in Belgium,46 the 
Netherlands,47 and the United Kingdom,48 added to the body of legal 
scholarship. Dissertations were also defended on international 
environmental criminal law49 and even on environmental criminal law in 
East Africa,50 Korea, and Japan.51 Moreover, Heine co-edited various 
volumes on environmental criminal law in the Scandinavian countries52 
and in Central and Southern Europe.53 The influence of this movement in 
legal scholarship was apparent at a preparatory colloquium of the 
Association Internationale de Droit Pénal (“AIDP”), organized in Ottawa 
in November 1992 and of which the proceedings were published in the 
International Review of Penal Law (1994).54 Many interesting draft 
                                                                                                             
44 Faure, supra note 41, at 111–25. 
45 Albin Eser was director of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal 
Law in Freiburg from 1991 until 2003. See Prof. Dr. Albin Eser, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR 
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, https://www.mpicc.de/en/home/eser.html (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2016). 
46 See, e.g., MICHAEL FAURE, UMWELTRECHT IN BELGIEN: STRAFRECHT IM SPANNUNGSFELD 
VON ZIVIL- UND VERWALTUNGSRECHT (1989). 
47 See, e.g.,WALING, supra note 30; CORNELIE WALING, DAS NIEDERLANDISCHE 
UMWELTSTRAFRECHT: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZU DEN DOGMATISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN UND ZUR 
PRAKTISCHEN ANWENDUNG (1991). 
48 See, e.g., OWEN LOMAS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BY CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES (1988). 
49 See, e.g., JOHANNES KLAGES, MEERESUMWELTSCHUTZ UND STRAFRECHT: ZUR 
AUSDEHNUNG DEUTSCHER STRAFGEWALT AUF DEN FESTLAND SOCKEL (1989); JÖRG MARTIN, 
STRAFBARKEIT GRENZÜBERSCHREITENDER UMWELTBEEINTRÄCHTIGUNGEN (1989). 
50 See, e.g., RALF SCHUHMANN, UMWELTSCHUTZ DURCH STRAFRECHT IN SCHWARZAFRIKA: 
EINE VERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG ANHAND EINER FALLSTUDIE FÜR KENIA (1991). 
51 See, e.g., BYUNG-SUN CHO, UMWELTSTRAFRECHT IN KOREA UND JAPAN: EINE 
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG DER NORMATIVEN UND DOGMATISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN 
UND DER PRAXIS (1993). 
52 See UMWELTSTRAFRECHT IN DEN NORDISCHEN LÄNDERN (Karin Cornils & Günter Heine 
eds., 1994). 
53 See UMWELTSTRAFRECHT IN MITTEL- UND SÜDEUROPÄISCHEN LÄNDERN (Günter Heine ed., 
1997). 
54 See Draft Resolution, 65 INT’L REV. OF PENAL L. 633, 1214 (1994). 
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resolutions were also proposed that would effect a de-coupling of 
criminal law from administrative law.55 
One could summarize the ideas of Günter Heine and his disciples as 
proceeding from the point that the close relationship between 
administrative and criminal law should be abandoned. Otherwise, the 
criminal law cannot award its full protection to the environment. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that one should immediately 
abandon any link between environmental criminal law and administrative 
law. Indeed, this link may even have certain advantages. First of all, 
administrative dependence has the advantage that it respects the lex certa 
principle that follows from the principle of legality in criminal law. Lex 
certa holds that the legislator should prescribe the criminalized behavior 
as precisely as possible.56 In case the legislator punishes violation of 
administrative norms (for example, conditions in a permit) the 
criminalized behavior will usually be relatively clear ex ante.57 However, 
one should also realize that referring to a permit may not always be the 
ideal way of criminalizing pollution since permit conditions can be vague 
and ambiguous. 
Secondly, one can hold that a link with administrative law is 
indispensable to some extent, since the alternative of simply 
criminalizing “pollution” would be too broad and vague. In that case (if 
such a broad definition was to be used) it would no longer be clear ex 
ante which behavior is criminalized and which is not. The example is 
given that it would not be useful to criminalize for instance “the one who 
would have contributed to climate change.” The impossibility of proving 
a causal link between certain behavior and the criminalized result would 
render such a provision inapplicable in practice.58 
Moreover, the formulation of obligations in administrative law may 
also contribute to making the concept of unlawfulness more precise in 
environmental criminal law. One can hope that it is the administrative 
authority which is best situated to determine whether a specific form of 
pollution is lawful or not. Indeed, administrative authorities may be far 
better qualified (given their expertise and thus their information 
advantage) than the judge in a criminal court to determine which type of 
pollution should be considered unlawful and which not. And this 
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56 See Michael G. Faure, Morag Goodwin & Franziska Weber, The Regulator’s Dilemma: 
Caught between the Need for Flexibility & the Demands of Foreseeability. Reassessing the Lex 
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information advantage of administrative authorities is thus a strong 
argument in favor of some link between administrative and 
environmental criminal law. 
Consequently, some link between environmental criminal law and 
administrative law should likely be retained. The primary decision on the 
admissibility of certain polluting acts should remain with administrative 
authorities within the limits set by law and respecting general principles 
of administrative law. 
As a result, different types of criminal provisions are necessary to 
protect the environment, all with a different goal and all with a different 
relationship to administrative law.59 An effective environmental criminal 
regime, according to Heine and the MPI scholarship, needs a combination 
that penalizes abstract endangerment of the environment and concrete 
endangerment of the environment, as well as an independent crime for 
when pollution has serious consequences.60 
1. Abstract Endangerment 
The notion of abstract endangerment refers to the fact that within this 
model the criminal provision usually does not punish environmental 
pollution directly. In this model the criminal law is an addition to a prior 
system of administrative decisions concerning the amount and quality of 
emissions into the environment. 
Within this system, the role of criminal law usually limits itself to the 
enforcement of prior administrative decisions that are taken. A distinction 
may be made between a dependency upon general administrative rules 
and principles (Verwaltungsrechts-akzessorietät) and the dependency 
upon individual decisions of administrative agencies (Verwaltungakts-
akzessorietät).61 In sum: breach of administrative obligations needs to be 
penalized. Some legal remedy needs to be used to guarantee compliance 
with important administrative obligations to avoid environmental 
pollution. However, since the link between the provision and the 
environmental harm is rather remote in this model, the penalty should not 
necessarily be very high and in some cases administrative penal law may 
suffice. It is, however, clear that in addition to penalizing abstract 
                                                                                                             
59 For an overview, see Günter Heine, Allemagne: Crimes against the Environment, 65 INT’L 
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60 See FAURE & HEINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 1–4. 
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endangerment, an effective environmental criminal law should do 
something more than punishing the mere failure to meet administrative 
obligations. 
2. Concrete Endangerment 
Concrete endangerment provisions treat an endangerment of 
environmental values posed by a concrete threat to the environment as a 
prerequisite to criminal liability.62 Under this provision, an abstract 
danger that some illegal operation might pose to the environment is 
insufficient for criminal liability. Usually, an emission criteria is set to 
value a given level of threat. Usually the provisions falling under this 
model do not require that actual harm needs to be proven, the threat of 
harm is sufficient. 
In addition, concrete endangerment provisions usually only lead to 
criminal liability if a second condition is met—an illegal emission. In a 
model of absolute administrative dependence, all that needs to be shown 
is that the act violated administrative rules. In the concrete endangerment 
model, the emission or pollution that can cause a threat of harm needs to 
also be proven. However, as long as the administrative rules are observed, 
no criminal liability is likely to follow since the act itself will not be 
unlawful. This departs from the serious environmental harm model, 
discussed below, in which criminal liability can occur even if 
administrative requirements were formally met. This type of provision, 
in which the unlawful concrete endangerment of the environment 
(through emissions) is penalized, has the advantage that one does not 
merely focus on the failure to abide by administrative obligations. This 
equally means that if enforcement of administrative obligations is 
lacking, criminal law can nevertheless intervene since an unlawful 
endangerment of the environment (through emissions) might have taken 
place. 
3. Serious Environmental Harm 
A third type of criminal provision directly punishes some cases of 
serious pollution. In fact, this model also punishes emissions, but the 
consequences are more serious—namely, long-lasting pollution, serious 
consequences for the health of persons, and/or a significant risk of 
injuries to the population. The main difference between this model and 
the others discussed above is that the linkage between criminal law and 
prior administrative decisions is completely removed. Under this type of 
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provision, serious environmental pollution can be punished even if the 
defendant has complied with the conditions of his license. The underlying 
notion is that the administrative regulation never allowed this specific risk 
or harm. These are therefore cases where the veil of the famous 
dependency of the administrative law is pierced. 
There are some examples of such an autonomous crime.63 It is also 
more important to notice that there is an international tendency to limit a 
defendant’s ability to rely on a license where they have caused serious 
harm to the environment.64 
There are instances of prohibitions unrelated to environmental law that 
punish the one who causes bodily harm to another. Most Penal Codes 
have provisions punishing the one who negligently or intentionally 
causes injuries to another, regardless of whether or not these injuries were 
caused through emissions into the environment. Again, in most legal 
systems these provisions still apply even if the defendant followed the 
conditions of a license.65 
This independent crime for serious pollution, of which several 
examples also exist,66 focuses again on emissions, but in this case on those 
that may also endanger human health. The major difference with the 
model previously discussed is that unlawfulness is no longer required. 
4. An Optimal Combination of Different Provisions 
At the policy level, the strength and weaknesses of various models 
show that an effective environmental criminal law really needs a 
combination of these various types of provisions. The penalization of 
abstract endangerment is necessary to give administrative obligations 
force. But these provisions are unsatisfying policy mechanisms because 
they apply even if no ecological harm or danger exists. Moreover, they 
cannot provide adequate protection if there is no violation of existing 
administrative rules.67 In that respect, the provisions merely penalizing 
the failure to meet administrative obligations (which remain necessary) 
need to be complemented with provisions aiming at the concrete 
endangerment of the environment. Penalizing unlawful emissions can do 
this. However, in some cases, the conditions of an administrative license 
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64 See Resolution 10 of the XVth International Congress of Penal Law, INT’L REV. OF PENAL 
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65 Heine, Aspekte des Umweltstrafrechts im internationalen Vergleich, supra note 42, at 83. 
66 Faure, supra note 24, 198–200. 
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may still provide a sort of affirmative defense. And the protection granted 
to the environment by a judge is already autonomous in that it is not 
limited to penalizing administrative failures. Finally, the system needs to 
be complemented with an independent crime applicable to serious 
pollution if a concrete danger to human life or health exists. Only at this 
level is the inter-dependence of environmental criminal law and 
administrative law entirely abandoned. 
Below in Part V, I will examine to what extent this regime, arguing for 
a more independent protection of the environment through criminal law, 
can be found in recent European and Member State legislation. 
B. Do We Have the Right Regime? 
Several commentators have questioned the interdependent relationship 
between environmental administrative and criminal law. The title of this 
Section paraphrases the title of a 2002 article by Anthony Ogus and 
Carolyn Abbot that questioned whether the United Kingdom—which 
relied almost exclusively on the criminal law to enforce environmental 
law—had “the right regime.”68 Before Ogus and Abbot’s article, 
questions had already been asked concerning the proper scope of 
environmental criminal law in other legal systems as well. In the 
Netherlands, Louk Hulsman initially pleaded for the allocation of a 
subsidiary character to the criminal law that would apply the criminal law 
only when alternatives (e.g., private enforcement and administrative 
fines) would not suffice.69 Later, Hulsman took a more radical approach 
by pleading in favor of a total abolition of the criminal law.70 Although 
his more radical approach was not largely followed, his plea to first 
consider other, less intrusive instruments than the criminal law and to use 
criminal law only as a last resort, was largely supported by De Roos71 and 
Faure72 in their comments on Dutch legal doctrine. Dieter Schaffmeister 
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was another who advocated import of the German distinction between 
administrative penal law from criminal law into the Netherlands.73 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s work on the enforcement pyramid was 
particularly influential and triggered further thinking into the need for 
applying the criminal law to violations of environmental law.74 Their 
work applied law and economics analysis to argue that criminal law was 
too costly to be generally applied to regulatory violations in cases where 
administrative penalties alone could suffice. Ogus utilized this analysis 
to argue in favor of a restrictive application of the criminal law for reasons 
of cost effectiveness75 and later, along with Carolyn Abbot, applied these 
insights to the domain of environmental law.76 Ogus and Abbot argued 
that the high threshold of proof and severity of criminal sanctions 
increases inherent costs of enforcement within the criminal law system.77 
As a result, prosecutors will have the tendency to use their discretion to 
bring only the most egregious cases to court.78 Put another way, the 
possibility of dismissal reduces use criminal law for a large proportion of 
environmental cases. If no alternative penalty is available in a particular 
case, environmental laws are thus likely to suffer from under-deterrence. 
Ogus and Abbot’s influence in the United Kingdom can be seen in the 
work of Professor Richard Macrory, who carried out a wide-ranging 
review of regulatory enforcement regimes for the UK Cabinet Office.79 
He came to the conclusion that enforcement systems should involve less 
reliance on criminal law and a greater use of administrative penalties.80 
Similar views in Belgium—more particularly in the Flemish Region—
were expressed in the 1990s during revision of environmental law in a 
Draft Decree on Environmental Policy.81 The Flemish Minister of the 
Environment ordered the Ghent Professor of Environmental Law, Hubert 
Bocken, to work jointly with a team of other scholars to craft a new Draft 
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Decree of Environmental Policy.82 Interestingly, the resulting Draft 
Decree contained a large chapter on administrative penalties, including 
administrative fines.83 The Draft Decree also had a system of aligning 
criminal and administrative enforcement through mandatory notification 
to the public prosecutor by the administrative body of its intention to 
impose an administrative fine. The prosecutor could then decide to 
initiate criminal proceedings or to agree with the imposition of the 
administrative fine.84 The commentary to the chapter on administrative 
sanctions made clear that the drafters felt a larger use of administrative 
sanctions—more particularly administrative penalties—had to be made 
because they could be imposed more rapidly and provide a sufficient 
deterrent effect.85 The Draft Decree illustrates the traction gained for 
limited last-resort application of criminal law in the Flemish Region 
during this time. 
Did we have the right regime? Notice that different streams of 
literature (criminological, law and economics, and administrative law) 
largely went in the same direction in the 1990s and early 2000s: in favor 
of a more limited role for criminal law and a larger role for alternatives, 
such as administrative fining systems. This is the “toolbox” approach, 
whereby a variety of different tools (civil penalties, administrative fines 
and criminal law) are at the disposal of enforcers. Enforcers may then 
choose which tool would be an appropriate remedy for a particular type 
of environmental offense. The toolbox approach is also empirically 
desirable. As the next Part will illustrate, data increasingly made clear 
that criminal sanctions were rarely imposed in practice. 
IV. EMPIRICS 
Relatively little is known about the enforcement of environmental law 
in practice. That was the case in the 1980s and is still largely the case 
today. In countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, 
and Germany data on enforcement activities as well as the output and 
outcome of investments in enforcement are rare. Moreover, the way in 
which data in the Member States are collected (if at all) is not 
harmonized. What available data does show is that where enforcement 
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authorities formally established that a violation took place, cases were 
often not prosecuted and simply ended with a dismissal.86 
A few facts and figures can illustrate this. For the Flemish Region in 
Belgium the Environmental Inspectorate collected data on the number of 
cases that were dismissed out of the total number of notices of 
violations.87 For the period 1998–2004 the Environmental Inspectorate 
noticed that of all of its notices of violation on average 64 percent of the 
cases were dismissed whereas approximately 7 percent were 
prosecuted.88 This low number of prosecutions casts doubts on the 
efficacy of the criminal enforcement system.89 
Similar data points come from the United Kingdom. Bell and 
McGillivray report that for the period 2000–2007, around 25,000 
pollution incidents were reported but less than 5 percent were 
prosecuted.90 Similar data were also reported by the group of German 
criminologists that participated in the Max Planck project on the 
protection of the environment through the use of criminal law. In their 
report to the German Law Association, Heine and Meinberg refer to data 
on the enforcement of environmental law for the period 1975–1986.91 
According to them in 1985 more than 40 percent of all criminal 
environmental cases were not prosecuted.92 In a later study, Lutterer and 
Hoch examined decisions of the public prosecutor concerning the 
prosecution of environmental crime and noticed that 60 percent of the 
cases were dismissed in 1997, whereas prosecution only followed in 7.9 
percent.93 
This small sample of studies indicate that environmental cases were 
not often prosecuted by the public prosecutor before the criminal court, 
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which led to high dismissal rates. That confirms the assumption made in 
law and economics literature that prosecutors will, given the high costs 
of criminal law, focus efforts on a few egregious cases and allow others 
to be dismissed.94 Two interesting conclusions may be drawn from the 
empirical studies. First, the probability of being detected and prosecuted 
was very low due to high rates of dismissal. The data provided by the 
Environmental Inspectorate on the Flemish Region suggests there was a 
20 percent chance that on average a company will be inspected on a 
yearly basis.95 The conditional probability of being prosecuted based on 
the number of prosecutions out of the number of notices of violations 
dealt with by the public prosecutor was even lower—7 percent.96 On 
average, data indicates that the probability an inspection would take 
place, the violation would be detected, and the firm prosecuted, was less 
than 1 percent, meaning that less than one in every hundred firms in 
violation would be detected and prosecuted.97 This raises serious 
questions on the deterrent effect of the criminal law.98 
Second, the German data provided by Lutterer and Hoch not only 
provided information on the prosecution of criminal cases, but also on the 
way in which administrative authorities dealt with cases in administrative 
penal law. Recall that for the criminal law, 60 percent of the cases were 
dismissed, whereas in only 7.9 percent of the cases did a prosecution take 
place.99 Contrast this figure with rates in the administrative penal law 
system, where a fine was imposed in 53 percent of the cases by the 
administrative authorities.100 In the administrative penal law system, 
some noticeable reaction took place in 57 percent of the cases, whereas 
in the criminal system this occurred only in 48.9 percent.101 Lutterer and 
Hoch therefore concluded that the probability of a sanction being 
imposed was higher under the administrative penal law than under the 
criminal procedure.102 These empirical conclusions validated the 
assumptions of commentators questioning environmental regimes and 
provided strong support for a radical change in environmental criminal 
                                                                                                             
94 See Michael Faure, Anthony Ogus & Niels Philipsen, Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: 
The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, 31 L. & POL’Y 170–71 (2009). 
95 See Faure & Svatikova, supra note 89. 
96 See id. at 260–66. 
97 Id. at 265. 
98 Combined with the fact that when a case was prosecuted and a conviction achieved the fines 
imposed were quite low as well. See id. The authors hold: “Thus on average, around 7% of [Notices 
of Violation] are prosecuted, which might not provide sufficient incentive ex ante to comply with 
the environmental regulations in the first place.” Id. 
99 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
100 Faure & Svatikova, supra note 86, at 278. 
101 Id. at 278. 
102 LUTTERER & HOCH, supra note 93. 
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law, towards a limited role for criminal prosecution and the development 
of alternative remedies. 
V. POLICY CHANGES 
The traditional approach towards environmental criminal law has been 
subjected to serious criticism from commentators supported by data 
establishing the relatively limited capacity of criminal law systems to deal 
with environmental crimes.103 A variety of policy changes in 
environmental criminal law in Europe are strongly in line with the 
suggestions made by critics. Some of these changes had already taken 
shape in the 1990s and have continued in this century. This is not to claim 
that these policy changes are a direct result of criticisms against the 
former regime. In some cases, indications for such a relationship can be 
provided, especially where academics who were at the root of the 
doctrinal moves described in Part III, supra, were directly or indirectly 
involved in policy changes. But this was not the case in all EU Member 
States and their environmental regimes differ. As a result, one can 
provide a few examples of some trends in specific Member States that 
constitute changes of the traditional enforcement approach, but the 
changes may be stronger in one Member State than in another and still in 
others, there may have been no change at all. 
In order also to analyze evolutions at the supranational level, I will first 
sketch the importance of the Council of Europe Convention of 1998, a 
relatively early policy document. Next, I will look at the importance of 
the EU Directive on Environmental Crime of 2008 and question to what 
extent it is a departure from the traditional enforcement approach and in 
line with the doctrinal suggestions. Finally, I will look at evolutions in a 
few Member States in order to provide examples of where those Member 
States have departed from the traditional enforcement approach in line 
with the doctrinal suggestions. 
A. Council of Europe Convention 
If there is a single document where one can see the influence of 
commentators, especially those associated with the Max Planck Institute 
project, it is the 1998 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of 
the Environment through Criminal Law.104 In this Convention, the various 
signatory states agreed to adopt specific provisions to protect the 
environment in their criminal law. It therefore contains minimum 
                                                                                                             
103 See supra Parts II–IV. 
104 The text has, inter alia, been published in FAURE & HEINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 5, at 407–16. 
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provisions on environmental criminal law. Interestingly, many of the 
ideas presented above can be found in this convention, more particularly 
the three types of provisions mentioned above. 
The core of the Convention is—not surprisingly—a concrete 
endangerment crime, which can be found in Article 2. This Article 
includes a long list of behaviors that the signatory states will criminalize 
on the basis of their respective national laws. Article 2(1b) refers to: 
The unlawful discharge, emission or introduction of a quantity of 
substances or ionizing radiation into air, soil or water, which 
causes or is likely to cause their lasting deterioration or death or 
serious injury to any person or substantial damage to protected 
monuments, other protected objects, property, animals or 
plants.105 
Here, one recognizes clearly the criminalization of concrete 
endangerment. It is the unlawful emission that is penalized. This 
provision goes much further than provisions that would merely aim at 
penalizing the failure to abide by administrative obligations. 
The Convention goes further and stakes out an independent crime 
aimed at serious pollution in Article 2.1(a): “The discharge, emission or 
introduction of a quantity of substances or ionizing radiation into air, soil 
or water, which: (i) causes death or serious injury to any person, or (ii) 
creates a significant risk of causing death or serious injury to any 
person[.]”106 Note that in this particular case, when an emission has the 
serious consequences of causing death, serious injury, or creating a 
significant risk of death or serious injury, the Convention abandons the 
“unlawful discharge” requirement. This is truly independent in the sense 
that this provision applies irrespective of the violation of administrative 
obligations. The idea is that emissions that cause death or serious injury, 
or create a significant risk of such damage, can never be justified under 
administrative law. 
Finally, the Council of Europe Convention also has the traditional 
abstract endangerment provisions, but they occupy a less important place 
in the Convention. More particularly Article 4 refers to the unlawful 
operation of a plant.107 Note, however, that in this particular case it holds: 
“Each party shall adopt such appropriate measures as may be necessary 
                                                                                                             
105 CONVENTION ON THE PROT. OF THE ENV’T THROUGH CRIMINAL LAW IN STRASBOURG, Art. 
2(1)(b) OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, (Apr. 11, 1998), in FAURE & HEINE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 398–99. 
106 See id. at 398. 
107 See id. at 400. 
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to establish as criminal offences or administrative offences, liable to 
sanctions or other measures under its domestic law.”108 
The drafters of the Convention clearly recognized that in the case of 
abstract endangerment, ecologic values are not endangered in the same 
way as with a concrete endangerment. For those, Member States can rely 
on administrative offences. 
Although the Council of Europe Convention has not yet entered into 
force, it demonstrates a new attitude towards environmental criminal law. 
If environmental criminal law is indeed supposed to play an important 
role in supporting sustainable development, it should not limit itself to 
sanctioning administrative obligations. Rather, criminal law should grant 
more direct protection to ecological values. This is clear where the 
Convention refers to unlawful emissions and recognizes pollution with 
serious consequences as an independent crime.109 The Convention 
preserves the criminal law, as had been proposed in German legal 
doctrine.110 In addition, the Convention explicitly refers to administrative 
offences for crimes of abstract endangerment.111 This facilitates a toolbox 
approach, whereby the criminal law may be reserved as an enforcement 
method of last resort. 
Incidentally, Günter Heine participated in the meetings in Strasbourg 
leading to the Council of Europe Convention.112 In addition, the 
Ministerialrat representing the German Government, Manfred 
Möhrenschlager, had published widely in the field and to an important 
extent in the same direction as the Umweltschutz durch Strafrecht 
publications.113 So it is not surprising that the Convention largely 
followed the ideas that were formulated at Max Plank and elsewhere. 
B. EU Environmental Crime Directive 
The harmonization of criminal law at EU level has a long and debated 
history, the details of which are beyond the scope of this Article.114 
                                                                                                             
108 Id. at 399. 
109 Id. at 398–99. 
110 See supra Section II.C. 
111 See FAURE & HEINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, 399–400. 
112 Id., at 397–406. 
113 See, e.g., MANFRED MÖHRENSCHLAGER, DAS NEUE WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT: 
KOMMENTAR (1986); Heinrich Laufhütte & Manfred Möhrenschlager, Umweltstrafrecht in neuer 
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114 See, e.g., Françoise Comte, Criminal Environmental Law and Community Competence, 12 
EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. R. 147–56 (2003); Françoise Comte, Environmental Crime and the 
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Suffice it to state that in 2000, Denmark took a first step within the 
framework of the then-called Third Pillar, with an initiative targeting 
serious environmental crime.115 Subsequently the Council of the 
European Union accepted a framework decision on January 27, 2003 on 
the protection of the environment through criminal law.116 This Council 
framework decision was based on the Council of Europe Convention on 
the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law. Resolving an 
institutional conflict, the Court of Justice of the EU of the Court held that: 
[although] as a general rule neither criminal law nor the roles of 
criminal procedure fall within the community competence . . . the 
last-mentioned finding does not prevent the community 
legislature, when the application of effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national 
authorities is an essential measure for combatting serious 
environmental offences, from taking measures which relate to the 
criminal law of the Member States which it considers necessary 
in order to ensure that the roles which it lays down on 
environmental protection are fully effective.117 
On the basis of this competence, two environmental directives were 
adopted: Directive 2008/99, adopted with respect to environmental crime, 
and Directive 2009/123, with respect to ship-source pollution.118 
In evaluating Directive 2008/99 in the context of doctrinal changes in 
environmental crime, two questions are presented: first, to what extent 
can the graduated punishment approach advocated by legal scholars be 
found in the Directive; and second, to what extent does the Directive 
allow for a toolbox approach? Starting with the latter question, it is 
striking that the positive comments concerning administrative law that 
were present in the Council of Europe Convention are totally absent in 
the EU Directive on Criminal Law protecting the environment. 
Administrative law is mentioned rather negatively. For example, Recital 
3 of the Directive holds explicitly that criminal penalties “demonstrate a 
social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared to 
administrative penalties or a compensation mechanism under civil 
                                                                                                             
231 (2006); Martin Hedemann-Robinson, The Emergence of European Union Environmental 
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115 2000 O.J. (C 39) 11. 
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117 2005 E.C.R. C-176/03. 
118 Directive 2008/99/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
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law.”119 Moreover, Article 5 of the Directive holds that specific violations 
need to be regarded as criminal offences in the national legislation 
implementing the Directive.120 The Directive does not explicitly 
incorporate suggestions from scholars advocating a toolbox approach.121 
Turning to the first question: The graduated punishment approach 
following from German legal doctrine holds that an optimal 
environmental criminal law consists of a combination of three types of 
different criminal provisions. Article 3 of Directive 2008/99 distinguishes 
nine offences.122 However, the offences described in the Directive are 
difficult fit into the three theoretical models of criminalization:123 
(a) the discharge, emission or introduction of a quantity of 
materials or ionising radiation into air, soil or water, which causes 
or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or 
substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the 
quality of water, or to animals or plants.124 
This provision is difficult to classify as within a single theoretical 
model. The first part of the provision refers to discharging or emitting or 
introducing a quantity of materials into air, soil, or water. These clearly 
constitute concrete endangerment crimes. However, the second part 
provides a specific condition that fits more with the serious 
environmental harm model: 
(b) the collection, transport, recovery or disposal of waste, 
including the supervision of such operations and the after-care of 
disposal sites, and including action taken as a dealer or a broker 
(waste management), which causes or is likely to cause death or 
serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality 
of air, the quality of soil, or the quality of water, or to animals or 
plants, . . . .125 
Here, the same problem with classification arises: the collection, 
transport, recovery, or disposal of waste is an abstract endangerment 
crime. However, as in provision (a), there is a requirement that this act 
would either cause or be likely to cause damage to human health or to the 
                                                                                                             
119 Council Directive 2008/99/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, 2008 O.J. (L 328) 28. 
120 See id. at 30. 
121 This does not exclude the possibility for Member States to retain administrative penalties, 
and also administrative fines. However, in order to implement the Directive correctly at least the 
infringements mentioned in the Directive should be threatened by the legislature with criminal 
penalties. 
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125 Id. at 30. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3372961
2017] Environmental Criminal Law in Europe 347 
environment. The causation elements appear to criminalize concrete 
endangerment. 
(c) the shipment of waste, where this activity falls within the 
scope of Article 2(35) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on 
shipments of waste126 and is undertaken in a non-negligible 
quantity, whether executed in a single shipment or in several 
shipments which appear to be linked[.]127 
Here, to the extent that there is “merely” unlawful shipment of waste, 
it is the unlawfulness of the shipment that is penalized, making it an 
abstract endangerment crime. However, since it also includes a 
requirement that the shipment should be undertaken “in a non-negligible 
quantity” one could equally argue that this unlawful shipment also caused 
threat of harm to the environment, which would fall under the concrete 
endangerment model. That would, however, require that there would also 
be abandonment by disposing of waste in an unlawful manor. The 
endangerment created by the shipment could be merely abstract, whereas 
an endangerment created by disposal or abandonment would be concrete: 
(d) the operation of a plant in which a dangerous activity is carried 
out or in which dangerous substances or preparations are stored 
or used and which, outside the plant, causes or is likely to cause 
death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the 
quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or to 
animals or plants[.]128 
Again, this is an example of a rather complicated formulation: the 
unlawful operation of a plant as such is a classic example of an abstract 
endangerment crime. However, in this case the condition is added that 
this operation would cause or would be likely to cause death or serious 
injury to humans or to the environment. Here the same comments apply 
as to provisions (a) and (b): 
(e) the production, processing, handling, use, holding, storage, 
transport, import, export or disposal of nuclear materials or other 
hazardous radioactive substances which causes or is likely to 
cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage 
to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or 
to animals or plants[.]129 
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This provision has the same construction as (d) and constitutes a 
concrete endangerment crime. 
The next provision in Article 3 reads as follows: “(f) the killing, 
destruction, possession or taking of specimens of protected wild fauna or 
flora species, except for cases where the conduct concerns a negligible 
quantity of such specimens and has a negligible impact on the 
conservation status of the species[.]”130 Here the classification seems 
relatively simple since “killing, destruction, possession or taking” all 
seem to require a specific consequence, which goes beyond the merely 
abstract and would make them fit all into the concrete endangerment 
category. 
The next provision in Article 3 reads as follows: “(g) trading in 
specimens of protected wild fauna or flora species or parts or derivatives 
thereof, except for cases where the conduct concerns a negligible quantity 
of such specimens and has a negligible impact on the conservation status 
of the species[.]”131 This seems more like an abstract endangerment crime, 
comparable to offence (c) discussed above (unlawful shipment of waste). 
After all, unlawful trading in protected wild fauna or flora may lead to an 
endangerment of particular values, but the endangerment is rather 
abstract. The focus of the offence is rather on the unlawful character of 
the trading, which would make it an abstract endangerment crime and of 
a less serious nature than the offences protecting similar values in (f). 
The next provision in Article 3 of the Directive reads: “(h) any conduct 
which causes the significant deterioration of a habitat within a protected 
site[.]”132 This provision seems to be relatively easy to classify since a 
concrete harm is required (significant deterioration of a habitat within a 
protected site), which makes it a concrete endangerment crime. 
The next provision in Article 3 refers to: “(i) the production, 
importation, exportation, placing on the market or use of ozone-depleting 
substances[.]”133 Here again the provision is rather difficult to classify 
since at least five different types of behavior are mentioned which can all 
potentially endanger the ozone layer, but in some cases the danger may 
be merely abstract (for example in case of production) whereas in other 
cases the danger may be more concrete (placing on the market) or could 
even lead to concrete harm (use of ozone-depleting substances). 
Depending on which type of behavior is at stake potentially any of the 
models could apply. 
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From the forgoing, the formulation of the crimes in the Directive 
clearly follows, at least to some extent, the suggestions made by scholars 
because they do not simply criminalize administrative disobedience. 
Note, however, that the way in which unlawfulness is defined in Article 
2(a) of the Directive, requiring an act that violates: 
(i) the legislation adopted pursuant to the EC treaty and listed in 
annex A; or (ii) with regard to activities covered by the Euratom 
treaty, the legislation adopted pursuant to the Euratom Treaty and 
listed in annex B; or a law, an administrative regulation of a 
Member State or a decision taken by a competent authority of a 
Member State that gives effect to the Community legislation 
referred to in (i) or (ii) . . . .134 
One might argue that this definition of unlawfulness establishes that 
none of the offences in the Directive follow the independent or 
autonomous crime model, whereby the administrative link would be 
completely eliminated and the “permit shield” does not apply.135 But the 
formulations above clearly go further than mere administrative 
disobedience. 
C. Member State Level 
Changes have occurred at the individual Member State level in recent 
years in line with the doctrinal moves advocated by scholars. While it is 
not possible to discuss all changes in all states in detail—and differences 
between Member States caution against generalities—a few influential 
examples demonstrate that the place of environmental criminal law has 
changed. There have been changes in the administrative dependence and 
we are increasingly seeing a “toolbox approach” to environmental 
enforcement. 
1. The Place of Environmental Criminal Law 
Recall that critics were skeptical of the structure of environmental 
criminal law, as it developed in the 1970s and ‘80s, insofar that criminal 
law was merely a supplement to legislation of an administrative 
character.136 Commentators reasoned that this did not sufficiently signal 
the seriousness of environmental crime and jeopardized effective 
                                                                                                             
134 Id. at 29. 
135 The term “permit shield” refers to the administrative dependence of environmental criminal 
law. See supra Section II.B. A consequence of the permit shield is that behavior will normally not 
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136 See supra Part II. 
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enforcement since enforcers would have to mind a large and piecemeal 
variety of different environmental laws. 
Several Member States have moved towards either incorporation of 
environmental crime into the penal code and/or a codification of 
environmental law generally, whereby environmental crime also received 
a specific place in an environmental code. Starting with the first, 
Germany and the Netherlands were first movers to some extent; Germany 
incorporated various criminal provisions in its penal code in 1980137 and 
the Netherlands in 1989.138 But others followed, such as Finland in 
1995.139 Southern European countries have also incorporated 
environmental crimes into their penal codes. Portugal has important 
provisions in Articles 278–281 of its Criminal Code.140 This new 
Portuguese Criminal Code, which came into force on October 1, 1995, 
includes the crime of causing damage to nature (Art. 278), a pollution 
crime (Art. 279), pollution causing a public danger (Art. 280), and danger 
to fauna and flora (Art. 281).141 Spain adopted a new Spanish Criminal 
Code in 1995 containing a broad spectrum of ecological offences in 
Articles 325–331.142 The criminal provisions deal, inter alia, with illegal 
emissions, but also crimes related to damaging cultural heritage, flora and 
fauna and others.143 
There are also many examples of incorporation of criminal provisions 
into a code or special environmental law. In the 1990s, many countries 
developed already-integrated environmental codes. Scandinavian 
countries provide many specifics. Criminal provisions are found in the 
Environmental Protection Act of 1991 in Denmark144 and in Sweden as 
                                                                                                             
137 See Heine, supra note 59, at 733. 
138 See Cornelie Waling, et al., Crimes Against the Environment, 65 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 1065 
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140 See Criminal Code of Portugal (2006), available at http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_
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1997); Anabela Rodrigues, Les crimes contre l’environnement. Quelques points du Droit 
Portugais, INT’L REV. PENAL L. 1125–1148 (1994). 
142 CÓDIGO PENAL (Criminal Code) art. 325–31, 1995. 
143 FAURE & HEINE, supra note 5, at 293; Miguel Polaino Navarrete, Spanien, in 
UMWELTSTRAFRECHT IM MITTEL- UND SÜDEUROPÄISCHEN LÄNDERN 497–546 (Günter Heine 
ed., 1997). 
144 For a more recent version, see the Consolidated Environmental Protection Act No. 698 of 
September 22, 1998, published and translated by the MINISTRY OF ENV’T & ENERGY, DENMARK, 
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well.145 In Sweden the major provisions concerning environmental crime 
could be found in the Miljöbalk 1998, an environmental code specifying 
penalties.146 Recently the criminal law provisions in this environmental 
code have been updated.147 Ireland and the United Kingdom already had 
relatively early general statutes protecting the environment, which also 
included criminal offences. Ireland enacted those provisions in the 
Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992;148 the United Kingdom 
enacted offences in the Environmental Protection Act 1990.149 However, 
both in Ireland and the United Kingdom these Environment Acts did not 
provide a complete harmonization or integration. Criminal provisions 
could still be found in other legislation dealing with specific sectors of 
the environment (like air, soil or water). Other interesting examples of 
integration of environmental criminal law can be found in the Flemish 
and Walloon Region in Belgium.150 In the Flemish Region a Decree of 
April 5, 1995 already contained general provisions on environmental 
policy.151 In 2007 a Title XVI “Supervision, Enforcement and Safety 
Measures” was added to this Decree, and it entered into force on the first 
of May 2009.152 This is referred to as the “Environmental Enforcement 
Decree.” This Decree contains criminal sanctions that apply to 
environmental legislation dealing with separate environmental issues. 
The Decree contains a long list of legislative provisions that all fall under 
the scope of its application. That integration implies that the criminal 
provisions are harmonized into one document and no longer scattered 
over different decrees and statutes. 
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A similar harmonization took place in the Walloon Region with a 
Decree of June 5, 2008, which equally brought together all criminal 
provisions and sanctions into a single decree.153 
2. Administrative Dependence 
There are also many examples in the modern environmental legislation 
of Member States where the criminal provisions do not merely punish 
administrative disobedience, they criminalize concrete endangerment 
and/or consequential harm to the environment as well. Again, one has to 
be careful with generalizations—Germany has had independent 
environmental protections since the 1990s—but later reforms are 
striking. For example, the new Articles 278 and following in the 
Portuguese Criminal Code target concrete endangerment of the 
environment and serious pollution. Note that there is still some 
administrative dependence in that one condition for criminal liability is 
unlawfulness.154 Similarly, some level of independence can be found in 
the new provisions in the Spanish Criminal Code. These provisions do 
not simply punish administrative disobedience, but also illegal emissions; 
and Article 325 criminalizes the engagement in environmentally 
dangerous activities in infringement of administrative laws.155 Where 
such activities cause a serious endangerment of human health, the 
Spanish provisions provide for greater sanctions. These provisions in the 
new Spanish Criminal Code thus punish the endangerment of ecological 
values and look more like concrete endangerment crimes. However, the 
requirement of unlawfulness maintains some degree of administrative 
dependence.156 
Similar evolutions can be found in other more recent changes in 
environmental criminal law. In Sweden, for example, where Article 29(1) 
criminalizes the pollution of land, water, or air in a manner which 
involves or is liable to involve risks for human health or detriment to flora 
and fauna that are not inconsiderable, or other significant detriment to the 
environment.157 Following a legislative change of 2004 “changing the 
surface and groundwater in a manner that harms or may harm human 
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health, animals or plants” is now criminalized.158 In France the 
formulation of environmental crime has also changed, in the sense that 
the country grants more independent protection to ecological values. 
Guihal, a court of appeals judge and well-known commentator on 
environmental criminal law in France, has remarked that in France the 
criminal law is now protecting the environment in a more autonomous 
way.159 
From these examples, we may conclude that there remains some 
relationship between environmental crime and administrative law in most 
legal systems. However, compared to the absolute administrative 
dependence in the old environmental laws of the 1980s, important 
changes have taken place. First, criminal behavior is now no longer only 
described as a violation of administrative obligations (e.g., the duty to 
have a permit), but rather in ecological terms (e.g., causing serious 
pollution). Moreover, although some relationship with administrative law 
is retained, the formulation has changed. More recently, criminal liability 
no longer requires a violation of administrative obligations, but instead 
rests on “unlawfulness.” The latter notion is undoubtedly broader than a 
mere violation of administrative interest. In that sense the lessons coming 
from the legal doctrine discussed above160 advocating a change from an 
absolute to a relative administrative dependence have been followed. 
3. Toolbox Approach 
As mentioned above, some legal regimes of the 1980s, such as those 
in Austria and Germany, had models of administrative penal law whereby 
the legislator had ex ante decided that particular violations would no 
longer be handled by the criminal law, but exclusively through 
administrative penal law. In other Member States, such as Portugal, the 
enforcement of environmental administrative statutes took place through 
administrative punishment of those regulatory offences.161 
The United Kingdom, following the recommendations of Macrory in 
2008–2009, introduced administrative fines. In England and Wales the 
introduction of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act of 2008 
gave some regulatory bodies, including the Environment Agency, the 
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power to impose a greater repertoire of civil (administrative) sanctions.162 
They were introduced by various administrative orders and regulations 
such as the Environment Civil Sanctions Order of 2010.163 And as a 
consequence in England and Wales, the Environment Agency can impose 
either a fixed monetary penalty or a variable monetary penalty. The idea 
of applying those fines is to fill the gap in enforcement where prosecution 
does not seem to be in the public interest.164 
Similar changes took place in the Flemish and Walloon Region as a 
result of the introduction of the Environmental Enforcement Decree 2008 
in the Flemish Region and a similar Decree of 2008 in the Walloon 
Region.165 In the Flemish Region, some environmental crimes have been 
declassified as administrative offences, which are no longer subject to the 
criminal law. In those cases, the administrative sanction is the only 
sanction available.166 For crimes which are still forwarded to the public 
prosecutor, there is a possibility for the Regional Agency to impose an 
(alternative) administrative fine—but only in cases where the prosecutor 
decides not to prosecute.167 We can recall that for the Flemish Region 
under the old system (of only criminal enforcement) 65 percent of the 
notices of violations were dismissed, which effectively meant that no 
remedy was imposed at all. Data on the enforcement policy after the 
introduction of the administrative fining system in 2008 show that 
dismissals—i.e., the cases where no enforcement reaction whatsoever 
takes place—had been considerably reduced. Those cases that the 
prosecutor dismisses are now sent to the administrative authority for 
imposing an administrative fine, as a result of which the number of cases 
where no reaction takes place at all has substantially decreased.168 
There are important differences between the Member States to note. 
For example, in the Netherlands a variety of different administrative 
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remedies do exist, but administrative fines have so far not been used in 
environmental law.169 In Spain, the introduction of administrative fines 
has still been opposed.170 The experience of the Netherlands and Spain 
shows that although there are some indications in some Member States 
that a toolbox approach is followed, this is certainly not the case for all 
EU Member States and neither is it the case for the European Union under 
the EU Environmental Crime Directive. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have sketched the ways in which treatment by the 
policymakers and legislators in Europe of environmental crime has 
changed over time in a rather revolutionary way. At the origin of modern 
environmental law, in the 1970s, environmental crime was not of 
significant interest to lawmakers. Rather, the main focus was on the 
administrative management of the environment. The goal of the criminal 
law was mainly to enforce administrative regimes. Critics found this way 
of treating environmental crime theoretically and empirically 
problematic. On one hand, over-inclusiveness increased the cost of 
channeling behavior that could be dealt with non-criminal remedies. On 
the other hand, criminal law itself was made too dependent upon the 
violation of administrative obligations, seriously limiting the capacity of 
the criminal law to award its protection to the environment. Various 
streams of literature between the 1980s and the early 2000s advocated a 
different way of dealing with criminal law. First, advocates supported a 
graduated punishment approach, arguing that an effective environmental 
criminal law system needs a combination of different types of provisions. 
At the same time, reformers introduced a toolbox approach, arguing that 
the criminal law should be reserved for the most serious infringements, 
whereas others could also be dealt with via other means such as civil or 
administrative penalties. 
It seems that these voices have, at least implicitly, been heard by some 
policymakers. Several legal systems have implemented important 
changes towards a more independent criminalization of environmental 
harm and have introduced a toolbox approach to enforcement that allows 
the criminal law to be reserved for the most severe violations. Although 
not all of these changes were the direct result of doctrinal reform efforts, 
the influence is undeniable. In some instances, we can point to a specific 
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author and in others we see a strong correlation between doctrinal advice 
and policy change.171 These policy changes occurred in many Member 
States, but certainly not in all. And at the EU level, there is room for 
continued improvement by implementing a toolbox approach to 
enforcement. 
The differences between the policy changes among EU Member States 
provides opportunity for comparison of policies and hence mutual 
learning may take place with respect to the relative effectiveness of 
different approaches. That, however, supposes that data collection 
challenges on the relative effectiveness of enforcement efforts may be 
overcome.172 The most important policy recommendation one may take 
away from the European experience is that a reliable system of data 
collection on enforcement efforts, preferably harmonized among EU 
Member States, should be developed. Only when such data becomes 
available is evaluation of the relative effectiveness of various 
enforcement systems between Member States possible. Only then can one 
expect to improve the enforcement of environmental law. 
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